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Rachel Darnley-Smith 
How can Schopenhauer’s paradoxical theory of music as representation of that 
which cannot be represented work?i 
Schopenhauer has been described as the ‘musician’s philosopher’ for the detailed 
attention he pays to music, assigning  the medium a ‘pride of  place in the arts’ 
(Budd, 1985:76ii). Schopenhauer’s aim to situate music as corresponding to the inner 
essence of man, that is to say the Will would seem to provide a perfect theory for the 
clinical discipline of music therapy whereby co-improvised music is hard to account 
for in words. However Schopenhauer’s metaphysical theory of music has received 
criticism in terms of its conceptual inconsistencies, (Han1997iii) for example that it is 
meaningless to speak of music as a representation of that which cannot be 
represented. (Budd, 1985:86), that Schopenhauer has failed in his attempt to show 
that music can be revelatory in a meaningful way, (Alperson, 1981:155iv) and 
furthermore that there is a problem of universality  in Schopenhauer’s argument with 
its reliance upon familiarity with the art form and an ‘intuitive act of faith’ (Bowie, 
2003:266-8v).  
Alternatively Young (1993vi) proposes that on many occasions ‘Schopenhauer ignores 
his [Schopenhauer’s] official view that music is a representation of the metaphysical 
“will”, treating it instead as a depiction of an entirely human merely psychological 
reality.’(1993: 21-22).vii 
In this dissertation I shall revisit Schopenhauer’s metaphysical theory of music in the 
light of this criticism and examine Young’s two-fold interpretation of Schopenhauer’s 
theory of music. I  shall alternatively investigate Schopenhauer’s theory of the body 
and of music as the objectivity of the Will with reference to theoretical pre-
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suppositions in clinical music therapy whereby music is understood both 
developmentally (Trevarthen C. and Malloch, S, 2000viii)and phenomenologically  
(Robarts, 1988ix) as originating in the body and thereby intuitively considered as 
essence.  
Much emphasis is given in the clinical discipline of music therapy to music as non 
verbal expression which says what words cannot say. Expression in this context can 
refer either to direct expression of feeling or an isomorphic expression of self, that is 
the music as our performative self (Aldridge 2000:11)x One method of music therapy 
within a psychoanalytic model entails freely improvising music between client and 
therapist, in a similar way, it could be said, (Darnley-Smith and Patey 2003:71xi) to 
the free improvisation of words spoken between a client and psychoanalyst, 
technically known as free association. In the day to day practice of music therapy the 
problem of meaning falls within the realm of philosophical aesthetics. For example it 
is often said in the clinical setting that ‘the music speaks for itself’. But how can this 
be conceptualised in terms of what music means from within a positivist model of 
treatment and cure. Bowie (2003:221) in his discussion of music and language in 
modernity‘ contrasts the privilege given to music because it can say the unsayable, 
‘that it can reveal aspects of the world that verbal language is unable to reveal’, as in 
Schopenhauer, with that of Hegel whose objection to music was based upon the same 
grounds, that it is impossible to conceptualise music, and therefore it must for ever 
remain in the realm of the subjective (2003:229), unable to be articulated via 
philosophical  conceptualisation. The paradox in music as presented by Schopenhauer 
can be seen as arising in music therapy: That is to say, Schopenhauer’s aim to equate 
music with the inner essence of man, a representation of that which cannot be 
represented poses the following question: what is it possible to say about a 
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phenomenon, music, which says the unsayable or represents the unrepresentable? If a 
client improvises such and such music with the therapist what can be said, or to be 
more specific, what in a medical setting can be written, in the patient’s notes?  
Schopenhauer‘s metaphysics 
The two volumes of The World as Will and Representation (WWR) published in 1818 
and 1844 respectively expounds the backbone of his philosophical system. As 
Janaway writes  (2002:6xii) ‘Schopenhauer’s ‘true destination’ is revealed in Volume 1...The 
dispassionate , Kantian exercise which Schopenhauer carried out in The fourfold Root of 1813 did not 
reveal the driving force of his philosophy. It did reveal the driving force of his philosophy. It did 
address questions concerning suffering and salvation, ethics and art, sexuality, death and the meaning 
of life’  
That is to say all these questions are examined in the World as Will and 
Representation as integral to and resulting from his metaphysical theory. 
Schopenhauer’s metaphysical theory is set out in both volumes, but volume two 
functions more as additional thinking, the first volume contains built upon a dualist 
reading of the world, in part incorporating theory from Kant’s philosophy, the 
distinction between phenomenon and noumenon, or appearance and the thing-in –
itself.  Schopenhauer postulates the world as at once both representation and will. 
However as integral to an understanding of the world he employs what could be 
understood as a mediating structure in his use of the Platonic Ideas. The work expands 
outwards from the opening Statement (WW1, p.3) 
‘The world is my representation’ which ‘if any truth can be expressed a priori it is this’ and that the 
whole of the world ‘is only object in relation to the subject’. That is to say, the world is not only 
a representation, it is always my representation, it always constitutes an object for a 
subject, there can be no object without a knowing subject, ‘we find that the two are one and 
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the same , for every object always presupposes a subject and thus remains a representation’ 
(WW1:95). However representations can only signify, they are not the signified: 
‘In the first book we considered the representation only as such, and hence only according to the 
general form…Therefore, directing our attention entirely to the representation of perception we shall 
endeavour to arrive at a knowledge of its content without which it would be worthless and empty. It 
will be of special interest for us to obtain information about its real significance, that significance , 
otherwise merely felt, by virtue of which these pictures or images do not march past us strange and 
meaningless, as they would otherwise inevitably do , but speak to us directly , are understood, and 
acquire an interest that engrosses our whole nature’. (WWR1:95) 
Schopenhauer shows how we can never truly know things via their representation, 
that the explanatory disciplines of science and mathematics can never be more than  
‘a record of inexplicable forces, and a reliable statement of the rule by which their 
phenomena appear, succeed and make way for another in time and space.’ 
(WWR1:98)Schopenhauer continues ‘we can never get at the inner nature of things 
from without. However much we may investigate, we obtain nothing but images and 
names.’(WWR1:99)  
Schopenhauer however rejects the Kantian idea that we cannot know things-in-
themselves, and expounds his theory of such knowledge through his theory of Will. 
The Will is the world considered from ‘the other side’ of representation and from this 
perspective, the ‘world as representation both as a whole and in its parts’ is the 
‘objectivity of the will’. (WWR1:169) Will is the essence of things. It is everywhere 
and in everything, and is prior to our sensible experiences of things and forms of 
knowledge (time, space, causality).This still does not answer the question which 
Schopenhauer poses as a riddle: 
‘What is the inner nature of things which the orderly relations among representations themselves do not 
reveal?’ (Janaway 1999:138) 
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The answer lies in the fact of our inhabitation of our own bodies. The body raises a 
special question within Schopenhauer’s theory, as ourselves as ‘knowing subjects’ are 
not just minds, our representations are ‘given entirely through the medium of a body, and the 
affections of this body are  ...the starting point for the understanding in its perception of this world’ 
(WWR1:99). So it follows that the body cannot just be given as representation, because 
we are our own particular bodies, and so uniquely the body is also given as will. For 
example that I move my fingers across the typewriter entails my perception of the 
objects in front of me, including my body. It also entails my inner understanding, my 
awareness that I am undertaking a certain act. ‘ The act of will and the action of the body are 
not two different states objectively known, connected by the bond of causality; they do not stand in the 
relation of cause and effect, but are one and the same thing, though given in two entirely different ways 
, first quite directly and then in perception for the understanding’ (WWR1:100)  
So, the answer to Schopenhauer’s riddle is knowledge of the will happens through the 
body. As he writes, ‘This and this alone gives him the key to his own phenomenon, reveals to him 
the significance and shows him the inner mechanism of his being, his actions, his 
movements…Therefore in a certain sense it can be said that the will is knowledge a priori of the body, 
and that the body is knowledge a posteriori of the will.  (WWR1:100). 
Schopenhauer’s particular incorporation of Plato’s theory of Ideas is the third element 
in his philosophy:  
The Will is not just a human phenomenon. It exists prior to any form of knowledge or 
plurality and therefore prior to any individual being, and is ‘consequently one’ so is to 
be found objectified throughout nature. However it is not objectified uniformly and 
the structure of the will’s objectification is theorised through the platonic ideas graded 
according to a natural hierarchy. At the bottom of this hierarchy are the ‘most 
universal forms of nature’ that is to say the forces which appear everywhere without 
exception: gravity and impenetrability. (WWR1:130) In contrast at the top of the 
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system is that which has the most individuality, the individual personality of man, 
together with the individuality of human form. (WWR1:131) 
‘..Such objectification of the Will had many but definite grades, at which with increasing distinctness 
and completeness, the inner nature of the |will appeared in the representation, in other words presented 
itself as object. In these grades we recognised the Platonic Ideas once more, namely in so far as such 
grades are just the definite species, or the original unchanging forms and properties of all natural 
bodies…therefore these Ideas as a whole present themselves in innumerable individuals and in isolated 
details, and are related to them as the archetype to its copies. The plurality of such individuals can only 
be conceived through time and space, their arising and passing away through causality…On the other 
hand the Idea does not enter into that principle ;hence neither plurality nor change belongs to it ’ 
(WWR1:169). 
Schopenhauer utilizes Plato’s theory of Ideas as a type of bridge: The will is universal 
and prior to individuation whereas objects in the world exist as representations, as the 
will objectified. However each representation is recognised as idea. Ideas, like the 
will are things in themselves, but unlike the will are specific- we can recognise them 
as an essential stage towards individuation. 
As I will show this metaphysical structure is the means with which Schopenhauer 
presents his understanding of music, and how in a number of ways music becomes 
synonymous with the will. 
Schopenhauer and Music  
Between 1814-1818 Schopenhauer lived in Dresden in Saxony, a city famous for its 
opera house and performances of Italian opera, popularly known as ‘the Florence of 
the north’.  Here Schopenhauer wrote and published the first edition of The World as 
Will and Representation.xiii During these years, as it would seem throughout his life, 
music played an integral role: he played the flute and frequently attended concerts and 
operas after long days isolated in his work. It may also be presumed that he attended 
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the opera performances by both the Italian and German Kapell-Meisterin, the double 
appointment being a new feature of Dresden musical life from 1817 onwards.xiv 
‘[He] soon became known as the person who rushed in hurriedly and usually late, 
often departed before the end of a performance and did not shrink from loud 
expressions of disapproval. Being an admirer of modernised Italian Opera, especially 
of Rossini, he was not greatly impressed by the efforts of the new music director, Carl 
Maria von Weber, who favoured German opera – to Schopenhauer’s mind merely 
ambitiously dressed-up musical comedy’ (Safranski, 1990:193)xv  
Schopenhauer’s regular exposure and critical interest in the contemporary music of 
his time, together with some technical knowledge as demonstrated in The World as 
Will and Representation. (WWRI and WWRII), possibly motivated his belief in the 
arts as ‘an acknowledged treasure of profound wisdom, just because the wisdom of 
the nature of things themselves speaks from them’ (WWR2:407) and the development 
of a metaphysical theory of aesthetics whereby music is considered as superior in 
relation to all the other arts, that its inexplicable nature corresponds to man’s essence. 
Schopenhauer’s commitment to music may also have motivated his quasi therapeutic 
stance towards the arts. Schopenhauer writes ‘that aesthetic pleasure in the beautiful consists 
to a large extent, in the fact that, when we enter a state of pure contemplation, we are raised for the 
moment above all willing, above all desires and cares; …Such a man who, after many bitter struggles 
with his own nature has at last completely conquered, is left only as pure knowing being, as the 
undimmed mirror of the world. Nothing can distress or alarm him any more’ (WWR: 390).  
For Schopenhauer ‘The aesthetic state in short is a signpost to the permanent solution 
to the problem of pain’ (Young, 1993:12). That is to say the apprehension or creation 
of art entails the suspension of a sense of self, and a letting go into the dimension of 
the will. 
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Schopenhauer’s metaphysical theory of music: The problem of Music as 
Essence  
Schopenhauer’s project in his theory of music was to demonstrate its indigenous 
relationship to the self, that is to say, the self as will. However, in so far as it would 
seem that music held a special curiosity for Schopenhauer, the metaphysical project 
also presented a special problem. Schopenhauer’s theory flows from his ‘explanation’ 
which at first appears paradoxical, that music ‘is a representation to that which of its essence 
can never be representation’ and that he regards music ‘as the copy of an original that can itself 
never be directly represented’ (WWR1:257). The arts, that is to say the fine and plastic 
arts, excepting music, always match something in the world, and Schopenhauer 
presents ‘that something’ through his version of Plato’s theory of Ideas. The arts, 
paintings, poetry, tragedy, architecture and so on, excepting music, are represented as 
Ideas. (Young, 1993:15)We understand the representations because we recognise 
them as Ideas. Music cannot be considered in the same general terms as the other arts 
since it does not match something in the world, it cannot be recognised as a repetition 
or  copy of ‘any Idea of the inner nature of the world’. That is to say music is elusive 
in terms of literal representational meaning, and thus it bypasses the Ideas.   
Does this mean that we are unable to obtain an understanding of music therefore? No, 
says Schopenhauer, even though music does not represent an Idea, music seems to be 
simply understood by man; apparently it needs no specific explanation.  
For Schopenhauer, the (Platonic) Ideas are the adequate objectification of the will, 
and the aim of all the other arts is to stimulate knowledge of these. Hence all the other 
arts objectify the will only indirectly and by means of the ideas. Music could still 
exists even if there were no world at all, that is to say in Schopenhauer’s metaphysics 
music is beyond plurality, and so prior to the forms of knowledge. Music is therefore 
‘as immediate an objectification and copy of the whole will as the world itself is…the objectivity of 
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which are the ideas.’ For this reason, Schopenhauer thinks ‘the effect of music is so very much 
more powerful and penetrating that the other arts’ (WWR1:257) It might be supposed that 
Schopenhauer presents Leibniz‘s definition of music to contrast with his theory so far. 
Leibniz defined music, ‘An unconscious exercise in arithmetic in which the mind 
does not know it is counting’xvi implying an understanding of music based upon the 
mathematical structures of harmony and rhythm.   
Han (1997:43xvii) writes of this rationalist position, ‘In his famous definition of music. 
Leibniz privileges the rational and mathematical structure of harmony over the 
emotional impact of melody…More precisely, he asserts that musical pleasure derives 
from a sort of isomorphism tying together musical harmony on the one hand, and on 
the other hand, the mathematical order which regulates nature as a whole’. 
But Schopenhauer is not satisfied with this, as it reduces the effect of music solely to 
a description of its form, whilst omitting content, or in this case omitting the idea of 
music as essence. 
‘..it [music] is such an exceedingly fine art, its effect on man’s innermost nature is so powerful and it is 
so completely and profoundly understood by him in his innermost being as an entirely universal 
language, whose distinctness surpasses even that of the world of perception itself, that in it we need to 
look for more than that ‘exercitium arithmeticae occultum nescientis se numerae animi’ which Leibniz 
took it to be.’ 
Schopenhauer presents this contrast of definition as a tension, which can be seen as 
derived from his theory of knowledge that ‘we can never get at the inner nature of things from 
without’ (WWR: 99). We can determine the structures of music but more work is 
needed to arrive at an explanation of essence, that is to say, form can never be reduced 
to the meaning of content. 
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For Schopenhauer the satisfaction of music could not be compared to the satisfaction 
of an outcome of a sum in arithmetic:  ‘we must attribute to music a far more serious and 
profound significance that refers to the innermost being of the world and of our own self. In this regard 
the numerical ratios into which it can be resolved are related not as the thing signified, but only as the 
sign’. (WWR:256) 
Schopenhauer argues that music must be more than its outward forms because music 
has a certain effect upon us internally. That is to say we have a private subjective 
response to it. From this Schopenhauer infers that ‘in some sense music must be related to 
the world as the depiction to the thing depicted.’ (WWR1:256) Furthermore since music is 
imitative [to the will] in its reference and since it is understood by everyone, music 
must be very profound, infinitely true and really striking. But, Schopenhauer clarifies 
he is not arguing that essence is all that music is, as ‘its forms can be reduced to quite 
definite rules expressible in numbers from which it cannot possibly depart without entirely ceasing to 
be music’. (WWR1:256). On the other hand Schopenhauer concedes that this link is not 
only very obscure, and indeed that he cannot demonstrate it. But that it is possible for 
men to ‘practice’ music ‘without being able to give an account of this…content to understand it 
immediately, they renounce any abstract conception of this direct understanding itself’. WWR1:256 So 
whilst it is possible to demonstrate the exterior of music through describing its forms 
as representation, this is not enough, as Schopenhauer’s metaphysical dualism of Will 
and Representation, together with our interior experience of music suggests. This is 
the basis for Schopenhauer’s metaphysical theory of music: Like Schopenhauer’s 
theory of Will and Representation, it is dualist in structure: Music comes as form but 
‘experience’ demonstrates is more than form, it has essence. Form and essence in 
music is reduced to ‘outer’ and ‘inner’ respectively. 
Schopenhauer sets out to demonstrate that the essence of music is not reducible to its 
form. It is through form that music ‘passes through the ‘principium individuationis’ 
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and is apprehended as objectified Will. His explanation ‘assumes and establishes a relation 
of music as a representation to that which of its essence can never be a representation, and claims to 
regard music as a copy of an original that can itself never be directly represented.’ (WWR1:257). That 
is why it is impossible to demonstrate. The essence of music can never be objectified, 
that is to say represented, and music is a non representational art form. Instead 
Schopenhauer advises the reader to test out his ideas for themselves, ‘that in order that a 
man may assent with genuine conviction to the explanation of the significance of music here to be 
given, that he should often listen to music with constant reflection on this’.(WWR1:257). 
 
What is the relation between music, the ideas and the will? Schopenhauer’s 
analogies 
Having made a case for music as by passing the Will, Schopenhauer presents a series 
of analogical arguments, firstly to make a case for the special relationship between 
music and the Ideas. He does this on the basis that the ideas and music are both 
objectifications of the same will, although in a different way, so Schopenhauer claims, 
there is not ‘an absolutely  direct likeness, but yet a parallel, an  analogy…’ (WWR1:258). He 
claims that the deepest tones of musical harmony are like the lowest grades of the 
Will’s objectification, that is to say the mass of the planet. This is because ‘all the high 
notes, light tremulous and dying away more rapidly , may be regarded as resulting from the 
simultaneous vibrations of the deep bass note.’ (WWR1:258). So it follows from this that, the 
Ideas are the Will’s objectification in all its grades. Music is like the Ideas as it is an 
objectification of the same Will, sharing the same structure. If Schopenhauer’s 
metaphysical system is to be accepted, the Ideas and music share the same relation to 
the world.   
R. Darnley-Smith/MA Dissertation/September 2004 11 
The analogy is now extended further, and suggests the theory of plurality, 
Schopenhauer writes that 
‘No matter is perceivable without form and quality, in other words, without the manifestation of a force 
incapable of further explanation, in which an Idea expresses itself, and more generally, no matter can 
be without Will.’ (WWR1:258). 
This is congruent with the fact that there is a limit to the depth of pitch at which a tone 
is audible, and ‘so a certain grade of the Will’s manifestations is inseparable from matter.’ (WWR: 
258). Schopenhauer is seeking to demonstrate here how his metaphysical theory of 
music matches the world. Musical tones can be sounded, but at the lowest and highest 
pitches cannot be heard by the human ear. He uses this knowledge to show in parallel 
therefore that music exists prior to forms of knowledge, in this case, sense perception. 
Our perception of musical tones can be seen as having the same structure as the 
relationship between the Ideas and the Will, with the essence, the known unknown.  
Schopenhauer then uses both these analogies, of harmonics and the plurality of forms 
of knowledge, as a basis from which to present further more specifically musical 
analogies, and it is here that Schopenhauer begins to utilize some technical knowledge 
of the ‘rules’ for musical harmony common in German music at this time as a basis 
for his argument. He presents the grades of the will as objectified in ideas as being 
like the relativity of pitch: ’Those nearer to the bass are lower of those grades , namely the still 
inorganic bodies manifesting themselves. Those that are higher represent to me the plant and animal 
worlds’  
Schopenhauer develops this idea by stating that the intervals of musical scale are 
parallel to the definite grades of the will’s objectification for example, such as the 
form of ‘definite species in nature.’ (WWR1:258, my italics.). He further claims on 
the same basis therefore that ‘The departure from arithmetical correctness of the intervals through 
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some temperament, or produced by the selected key, is analogous to the departure of the individual 
from the type of species…in fact, the impure discords, giving no definite interval, can be compared to 
the monstrous abortions between two species of animals, or between man and animal’. (WWR259) 
Schopenhauer also applies this same analogy to all the musical voices in a piece of 
music, the bass, and what he terms as the ripieno, which is usually a technical term 
denoting the non solo parts of the orchestra in a concerto for examplexviii. In this case 
however it is as though Schopenhauer actually means all the parts, such as the inner 
harmonies, in addition to the bass, which in his opinion are non-melodic, those parts 
which are ‘without melodious connection and significant progress…are analogous to the fact that in 
the whole irrational world, from the crystal to the most perfect animal, no being has a really connected 
consciousness that would make its life into a significant whole.’ (WWR1:259).  
Finally, Schopenhauer presents a series of analogies between the will and melody, the 
latter being analogous to highest grades of the will’s objectification.  
‘…..in the melody, in the high, singing principal voice, leading the whole and 
progressing with unrestrained freedom, in the uninterrupted significant connection 
of one thought from beginning to end , and expressing a whole, I recognize the 
highest grade of the will’s objectification, the intellectual life and endeavour of 
man.’ 
Schopenhauer argues that it is in the nature of man that his will constantly strives 
oscillating between desire and satisfaction. He says that this corresponds to the ‘nature 
of melody… [As] a constant digression and deviation from the keynote in a thousand ways, not only to 
harmonious intervals, the third and dominant but to every tone, to the dissonant seventh, and to the 
extreme intervals; yet there always follows a final return to the keynote.’ (WWR1:260) 
By illustration of this one could take any simple folk tune or Christmas carol and 
hear how the melody begins and ends in the same tonal place having ‘travelled’. 
For example the Irish Air, Down by the Sally Gardens repeats the same musical 
R. Darnley-Smith/MA Dissertation/September 2004 13 
phrase twice before deviating and then finishing with the original musical phrase. 
Inherent in the music is a sense of statement, development and return. The 
feasibility of generalising from Schopenhauer‘s analogies to the will, in that his 
musical examples are quite specific, will be explored in more depth below.   
 
 
Schopenhauer now describes music in terms of emotion, equating emotion with what 
the composer ‘reveals’, that is to say ‘the innermost nature of the world’. He gives 
instance of musical expression, in citing particular musical directions, for example the 
‘adagio in the minor key reaches the expression of the keenest pain, and becomes the most convulsive 
lament’ (WWR1:261).  
However, in possibly the most important distinction in Schopenhauer’s theory of 
music, he explains how this does not mean that it is literally the music itself that 
expresses the feeling, that is to say the phenomenon. Rather the music expresses 
the  
‘inner nature, the in-itself, of every phenomenon, the will itself’. Therefore music does not express 
this or that particular and definite pleasure, this or that affliction joy, pain…but joy, pain, 
themselves, to a certain extent in the abstract, their essential nature, without any accessories and so 
also without the motives for them. (WWR1:261) 
Schopenhauer argues that this is why composers have set words to music, since the 
music seems to be able to relate so easily to what the composer wants to convey. 
Again, this does not mean that music should be made to fit with what the words 
say, for example, this is the problem with some opera, and other music which sets 
out to convey a non-musical picture or idea,  
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‘…if music tries to stick too closely to the words, and to mould itself according to the events, it is 
endeavouring to speak a language not its own’ (WWR1:262).  
Rather, music and words exist in two different realms, it is like the example 
Schopenhauer gives of the man who ‘gives himself up entirely to the impression of 
a symphony, it is as if he saw all the possible events of life and of the world 
passing by within himself. Yet if he reflects he cannot assert any likeness between 
that piece of music and the things that have passed through his mind.’ 
From this point Schopenhauer formulates the idea of the universality of music, as a 
thing in itself, analogous to the universality of concepts, but not in an abstract way. 
Rather, like ‘the geometrical figures and numbers which are the universal forms of all possible 
objects of experience and are a priori applicable to them all and yet are not abstract, but perceptible 
and thoroughly  definite…we could just as well call the world embodied music as embodied will; 
this is the reason why music makes every picture appear in enhanced significance and this is , of 
course all the greater more analogous its melody is to the inner spirit of the given phenomenon’ 
(WWR1:262) 
More about Music Therapy 
As Budd (1985:76) implies, Schopenhauer’s theory of music has been notoriously 
influential, and despite the conceptual problems commentators find inherent, it seems 
as though musicians are able to relate to what he has to say. As stated above Music 
Therapists face the problem of problem of musical meaning anything each day of 
their working lives. They experience long silences from their patients if they try to 
encourage some reflective discussion about the music that has been improvised, not 
just people might be depressed or have cognitive difficulties with speech. As 
mentioned above they find it hard account for clinical sessions in terms of the music 
which was made, describing the type of music or simply what happen does not reduce 
into what the music in the session meant.  In this section I want to briefly go into a 
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little more detail to show how in a practical way Schopenhauer’s theory can be related 
to a particular approach to music therapy which initially focussed upon work with 
children.  
  The following paragraph opened an influential text book of music therapy which 
during the 1970’s heralded a way of thinking about the use of music and health: 
‘The concept of the music child presented itself as the means of summing up the depth, the intensity, 
the variety and the intelligence in the responses of some hundreds of handicapped children in musical 
interactivity…..This concept is not limited to the child with special musical gifts but focuses attention 
on that entity in every child which responds to musical experience…The music child is therefore the 
individualised musicality born in each child: the term has reference to the universality of  musical 
sensitivity – the heritage of complex sensitivity to the ordering of tonal and rhythmic movement; it also 
points to the distinctly personal significance of each child’s musical responsiveness.’ (Nordoff and 
Robbins, 1977:1xix) 
The significance of the idea of the ‘music child’ lies in its essentialist quality which 
defies the equating of music with special talent. Musicality resides inside all of us, it 
categorically states. The music child concept, developed as an explanation for the 
musical responses these two pioneering clinicians experienced from children who 
were in some way or other profoundly disabled physically, emotionally or 
intellectually, and the idea of music as will. The children Nordoff and Robbins 
worked with did not need to be taught how to play music, or how to respond to music; 
with the support of the therapists who were developing special ways of improvising 
and song writing for therapeutic purposes, music simply happened. Whilst they might 
write special words for songs or improvisations, it was the music itself that was of 
chief importance. Whilst they assiduously devised methods of assessment for the 
therapy which measured non-musical goals, it is noticeable that they were reluctant to 
create specific ways of building meaning into the musical material, a way of 
understanding what it meant. There are links to be made between Schopenhauer’s 
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idea of music as will and the music child and Schopenhauer’s theory of music as 
universal principle existing prior to the forms of knowledge, the innermost kernel. 
According to Schopenhauer because music is the will we understand it perfectly 
‘ Hence it arises that our imagination is so easily stirred by music , and tries to shape that invisible , yet 
vividly aroused, spirit world that speaks to us directly ’  (WWR1:261) 
Nordoff and Robbins’s method was based upon the idea of evoking the music or 
music child from within, as opposed to the idea that music needed to be introduced to 
the child, the child already recognised the medium and knew what it was for.  
They write 
For the child who is intellectually impaired, music and musical activities can be vivid intelligible 
experiences that require no abstract thought…in attempting to depict the central motivating power of 
music therapy – a child’s commitment to his musical activity. 
Like Schopenhauer they were dissatisfied with the relationship between music and 
words, that music somehow surpasses conceptual meaning: 
 we have become all too aware of the limitations of words to describe musical experience. Only music 
itself can convey the meaning of its experience, and much more is involved in this than auditory 
stimuli, rhythm, the “tune” associations, and so on.’ (Nordoff and Robbins, 1973xx) 
In application it can be seen that there are a number of important correspondences 
between Schopenhauer’s theory and the music therapy method of free music making, 
that a Schopenhaurian explanation of music at some level makes sense. 
 I shall now turn to a discussion of some of the conceptual difficulties with 
Schopenhauer’s theory of music. 
Discussion 
Commentators cite a number of conceptual problems with Schopenhauer, three of 
which I shall focus upon. Firstly that of the inconstancies in Schopenhauer’s thinking. 
Secondly I shall introduce Julian Young’s particular reading of Schopenhauer which 
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allows for a more flexible reading of his musical theory. I shall then focus upon two 
problems which seem to be retained by his theory, whether the musical analogies are 
convincing and the problem of music being conceptualised prior to time. 
The main thrust of Schopenhauer’s metaphysical theory of music is that music is a 
representation of that which cannot be represented. The outward form of music cannot 
tell us what its inner meaning is, although without such form we will not have music 
at all.  Schopenhauer explains this to his reader with regard to the difficulty of making 
inferences about the will. He writes ‘..the word will, which, like a magic word, is to reveal to us 
the innermost essence of everything in nature, by no means expresses an unknown quantity , something 
reached by inferences and syllogisms, but something known absolutely and immediately , and that so 
well that we know and understand what will is better than anything else, be it what it may.’ 
(WWR1:111)  Schopenhauer makes a similar point with reference to his musical theory 
‘in order that a man may assent with genuine conviction to the explanation of the significance of music 
here to be given, that he should often listen to music with constant reflection on this [that is to say, the 
theory of music] (WWR1:257). These sections demonstrate further to the exposition 
above, the difficulty Schopenhauer acknowledges in conceptualising a theory of 
music within a metaphysical structure where music exists prior to concepts. Even so, 
there are a number of conceptual problems which have arisen cited with differing 
emphases by a number of commentators.  
Han (1997:48) points out the ‘seemingly insoluble difficulties of Schopenhauer’s 
claims.’ She notes that ‘section 52 of the World as Will and Representation [WWR1: 
255-267] presents us with no less than five definitions of music: Music is successively 
characterised as the “re-production” the objectification, the “objectivity”, and finally 
the “incarnation” of the will before being completely identified with the latter’. 
Alperson (1981) argues in what we might term a ‘no win’ situation that Schopenhauer 
fails in his main aim –to show that musical experience provides us with a unique kind 
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of revelation ’ (1981:155). He argues that if Schopenhauer shows that ‘what is 
revealed by music is not expressible as specific ideas in a body of propositions (or by 
some other means), then one cannot say (or otherwise specify what has been 
revealed,) so the claim to revelation is empty. If, on the other hand, what is revealed 
by music is otherwise expressible as specific ideas in a body of propositions (or by 
some other means), then it is hard to see why…music should be valued for its 
revelatory function: music would not be remarkable in this regard.’ (1981:160). Budd 
makes a similar critique: to describe music as a representation of that which cannot be 
represented simply does not make sense. His (Schopenhauer’s) explanation is 
problematic because if the term ‘representation’ is taken seriously the explanation 
does not make sense. What cannot be represented cannot be represented –even by 
music’ (Budd, 1994:86-7). None of these commentators however, completely dismiss 
Schopenhauer. For Budd the initial answer to the problem is to understand the thesis 
that music is a representation of the will in a non-literal way. ‘–the sense, [writes 
Budd] that Schopenhauer had in mind- can be discovered by a consideration of what 
[he] says about the relation between music and the Ideas’ (1994:86-7). It can be seen 
that Schopenhauer has relied heavily upon analogy as his means of showing the 
relationship between music, the ideas and the will. Budd on the other hand finds each 
parallel to ‘be fanciful’ bearing ‘no significant relation to the experience of music’. 
This is, according to Budd (1985:96) with the exception of Schopenhauer’s analogy 
between melody and Will. He writes, ‘We must reject all the parallels Schopenhauer 
draws between aspects of music and alleged manifestations of the will except those 
which relate to phenomena in which there is pain and pleasure and genuine striving 
for a goal’ but that if we accept his conception of music as understood in this 
‘diminished form it asserts a likeness between music and conscious goal-directed 
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activity…’.  It could be argued though that whilst there are certainly problems with 
Schopenhauer’s musical analogies, particularly where he makes comparisons between 
aspects of the will and music, Schopenhauer seems to be writing from the point of 
view of opinion rather than aesthetic theory. His ‘monstrous abortions’ analogy with 
‘the departure from arithmetical correctness’, (WWR1:258-9) which Budd dismisses, 
is quite possibly Schopenhauer giving vent to opinion within a contemporary debate 
about the modern tuning of instruments in equal temperament.  
Young (1993:5-24) develops Budd’s strategy in his suggestion of a solution to the 
conceptual problems in Schopenhauer’s musical metaphysics which allows for a more 
than one reading and therefore more flexibility of interpretation.  I shall look at the 
problem of the analogies seeking a means to solve the problem of their personal 
specificity. 
Young invites us to ‘notice that Schopenhauer’s account of the absoluteness of music 
has two aspects to it:  
• on the one hand music is said to be about metaphysical reality, the thing in 
itself;  
• On the other hand it is said to be about psychological reality, about “will”. 
Young suggests that this double ‘aspectedness’ is responsible for ambivalence in 
Schopenhauer’s theory that comes to a head in the case of opera. If we focus upon the 
metaphysical reality, the thing in itself, the status of opera, becomes highly 
problematic in that it is structured through narrative, action and visual image, so 
implicitly representational, 
‘If music gives us direct access to the thing in itself…If the highest form of art is that 
with the greatest cognitive value, then it would seem to follow that the highest form of 
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music is purely instrumental..and if we further assume, as Schopenhauer tends to, that 
music has only one proper function, opera comes to appear as a debased form of art 
(1993:21).  
But, Young points out, this does not seem to fit with what Schopenhauer writes about 
opera, ‘his writings are full of glowing references to the individual operas of Mozart, Rossini 
and…Bellini.. .’(1993:22)He suggests that  
‘…Schopenhauer ignores his official view that music is a representation of the metaphysical “will”, 
treating it instead as a depiction of an entirely human merely psychological reality.  
Developed in this way, Schopenhauer’s theory of musical representation posits, as its object, human 
emotions. Not however “particular and definite” emotions but, rather their “inner nature” divorced 
from all accessories and so also without any motives for them (WWR1:261, cited Young)….he treats 
the way in which music depicts , as we might call it, the feeling of feeling as a matter of isomorphic 
correspondence between , on the one hand, elements of the represented emotion and on the other, 
elements (mainly rhythmic and melodic) in the music…Understood in the above non-metaphysical way 
as a precursor to [Susanne ] Langer, Schopenhauer’s theory of musical representation becomes highly 
“opera friendly” , for on it opera becomes not only highly legitimate but might even be regarded as 
(speaking from Schopenhauer’s cognitivist point of view) the highest art form. For if music depicts the 
inner reality of human life and words the outer, then music and words appear to be ideally suited to 
combine in the presentation of a stereoscopic vision of the world.’ (1993:23) 
In diagram 1.it is possible to see Young’s contrasting of a metaphysical reading with a 
psychological reading of Schopenhauer, together with the problems which are 
retained.  
Even if we accept that Young has provided a more flexible reading of Schopenhauer’s 
theory, it is evident that the musical examples provided in the text may be too specific 
to western art music of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, or in places too 
specific to particular pieces. For example not all bass lines in music of this time, 
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perform the harmonic function Schopenhauer relies upon for his analogy with the 
‘ground bass’ and the ‘lowest grades of the will’ . 
It would seem legitimate therefore to question the basis for the analogical structure of 
Schopenhauer’s metaphysical theory of music on the grounds that it is only possible 
to understand and indeed accept the argument through reference to European art 
music of the eighteenth-nineteenth centuries. This does not seem too serious a 
problem in itself. At worst, from a twenty-first century view where technology 
provides instant access with little human effort to any kind of music we could 
conceive of, Schopenhauer’s perspective seems rather parochial. But it begs a 
question of whether the theory could only apply to the specific type of music he is 
writing about, if Schopenhauer is formulating music as the Will, does he mean any 
music or specifically the music to which he refers? Bowie (2003:267) makes the point 
that ‘Schopenhauer writes wholly within the specific Western musical tradition which 
develops with Viennese classicism: the resolution of tension within sonata form is the 
best example of the sort of music he is referring to’. Is it possible to find such a 
specific stylistic device in any other kind of music, would such music still be an 
indicator of the will?  
It is relevant to compare this view with an empirical perspective from academic music 
psychology. For example Schopenhauer’s analogy between the will and melody begs 
the question whether the concept of a melody is unique to the context within which 
Schopenhauer is writing. One way to approach this is via reference to harmony and 
scale patterns in music upon which the construction of a melody is based. Sloboda 
(1985:253xxi) poses the question whether ‘there are some underlying features which 
typify most music’ and one such area is the ‘use of pitch dimension in different 
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cultures’.  If there is, he argues, ‘these might be related to some universal cognitive 
basis for music which transcended individual cultures’ 
He writes ‘A very large number of cultures contain both in theory and practice the 
notion that music takes place with respect to certain fixed reference pitches. These 
pitches need not be fixed for all time, but are usually fixed for the duration of a single 
piece of music. In many cultures the principle reference pitch (or pitches) are 
maintained throughout the music in the form of a (usually instrumental) ‘drone’. Even 
where drones are absent, we can usually see that certain pitches are privileged in that 
music often returns to them, and circles around them…thus although tonality as we 
know it is by no means universal, the notions of scale and tonic have formal analogies 
in most cultures. (1985:253).  
Sloboda continues by referring to a universal phenomenon of subdivision within 
scales which commonly possess an unequal interval. He cites Shepherd (1982xxii) who 
argues that it is this property of uneven spacing which ‘enables the listener to have, at every 
moment, a clear sense of where the music is with respect to such a framework. Only with respect to 
such a framework can there be things such as motion or rest, tension and resolution, or in short, the 
underlying dynamisms of tonal music....’(Sloboda, 1985:255). 
This empirical research can provide some confidence that whilst Schopenhauer was 
writing from within a particular musical context, with regard to his analogies between 
particular stylistic features of music and the will, it is possible to consider his theory 
in more general terms. Whilst his analogy between the grades of the will and the 
harmony (WWR1:259) seems at first to be predicated upon a very limited conception 
of a bass line, in the broader context given to us by Sloboda, it is possible to read 
Schopenhauer as stating something more fundamental about music. Here it is possible 
to substitute the analogy between the bass harmony and the lowest grades of the will, 
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for the ‘drone’. Indeed the drone is often associated with long held notes which 
maintain the harmony. An example of this would be the Bagpipes, a well known 
instrument in Europe which incorporates one or more drone pipes which sound 
unaltered harmony notes. It is also possible from this same perspective to concede 
Schopenhauer’s idea of melody as corresponding to the will, ‘the nature of melody is 
a constant digression and deviation from the keynote in a thousand ways…’ 
(WWR1:260). 
However there is a deeper question to consider and that is Schopenhauer’s theory that 
music as a ‘universal language’ is prior to concepts, and therefore to philosophizing. : 
As music is the phenomenon to the in-itself, ‘this is why ‘music makes every picture, 
indeed every scene from real life, and from the world, at once appear in enhanced 
significance…it is due to this that we are able to set a poem to music as a song….For 
to a certain extent melodies are like universal concepts an abstraction from reality’. 
Both melodies and concepts are similar because they ‘furnish what is perceptive, 
special and individual, the particular case, both to the universality of the concepts and 
to that of the melodies’. However as universalities, concepts contain forms which 
have first of all been abstracted from perception, whereas music ‘gives the innermost 
kernel preceding all form or the heart of things. ‘Schopenhauer suggests that their 
relation could be expressed ‘in the language of scholastics’, that ‘the concepts are the 
universalia post rem, but music gives the universalia ante rem, and in reality the 
universalia in re.’ (WWR1:263) 
Han (1997) notes a conceptual problem here with Schopenhauer’s theory on the 
grounds that it is hard conceptualise music, (which is a supremely temporal 
medium) as prior to the forms of knowledge. She cites the view from Jankélévitch 
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(1983xxiii) that ‘it is hard to see how sonorous impressions can escape from the form of time and 
thus from the principle of sufficient reason itself.’ Schopenhauer makes a fleeting reference 
to the question of time with regard to music, emphasising (his opinion of) a sort of 
‘perfect music’ in which the will can be objectified. He then continues ‘Thus the one 
will outside time finds its complete objectification only in the complete union of all the grades that 
reveal its inner nature in the innumerable degrees of enhanced distinctness’ (WWR1:265) 
Possibly Schopenhauer realised the problem he was creating, ‘I might still have much 
to add on the way in which music is perceived, namely in and through time alone with absolute 
exclusion of space, even without the influence of the knowledge of causality, and thus of the 
understanding’ (WWR1:266). But he does not address music’s status as essence in 
relation to time.  Han continues ‘This raises another difficulty, since such an escape is called 
for by Schopenhauer’s claim that music is the immediate objectification of the will,’ (Jankélévitch, 
1983:26-27,). Moreover, if music must submit itself to the most general form of representation its 
‘privileged access to the noumenal essence of the world will disappear along with its ontological 
primacy over the other arts’ (1997:49).  
A psychological reading of Schopenhauer’s theory of music might allow for some 
examination of a developmental view of music, which in turn might accommodate 
a conception of time with regards to music. That is to say, our experience of the 
body is an experience of living in time. As Han (1997) points out, Schopenhauer’s 
metaphysical treatment of music as will does not allow for music to take place in 
time; in these terms it is theorised purely as prior to individuation, as a universal  
and therefore prior to time as a form of knowledge.  If the body is given as will in 
time, then could it be possible to conceive of music as objectified will also as 
occurring in time? 
I want to suggest that as we apprehend the will through our bodies, we also 
apprehend music, not in the formalised way that Schopenhauer has described, but 
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music in its elemental form, that is to say rhythm, pitch, timbre and duration, prior 
to its becoming an ‘artwork’  
However as described above , the will as object is given through the body,  not as a 
whole will, but an individual will, and so, ‘I know my will …only in individual acts and 
hence in time which is the form of my body’s appearing, as it is of every body’. (WWR1:101-2). 
Schopenhauer, as described above, gives the body high status with regard to our 
apprehension of the will. He writes how the body and the affections of the will are 
the starting point for our understanding of the world. The action of the body is 
nothing but the act of will objectified, that is to say translated into perception. 
Every true, genuine and immediate act of will is also at once and directly a 
manifest act of the body. The knowledge I have of my will, although an immediate 
knowledge cannot be separated from my body. (WWR1:99-101) 
If as knowing subject the will is given to me through my body, I apprehend the will 
objectified in time, as I apprehend my individual body likewise. But my body is 
not a static being, through my intentional acts as a body I experience will. It could 
also be said that through acting I am acting musical elements.  
Robarts (1998) writes of how music can be conceptualised as implicitly part of our 
bodies 
‘The impulses of walking, breathing, heartbeat, autonomic processes, and indeed all 
kinaesthetic or motion sensing aspects of expression through movement, with the 
tonal inflections of our voices (whether in laughing, crying, or speaking) form a 
musical hierarchy or orchestration of self regulation and self-organisation, all directly 
linked to feeling states, and to their emotive transmission towards others.’ (1998, 
p.176xxiv)  
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For Robarts musical elements are here inextricably indigenous to the intentional acts 
of the body. This is together with (as per Young’s psychological reading of 
Schopenhauer) ‘feeling states’ posited as objects. However Schopenhauer has 
constructed a theory of music in which it is not the music itself which creates 
individual feeling, indeed this would be not to recognise it as will, but our recognition 
of it as an expression of a generalised feeling in itself.. Robart’s constructivist 
perspective of music as a music therapist begins with the body and implies that it is 
here that music originates. It is as though, for Schopenhauer, on the one hand music 
occurs independently of man, that it is ‘found’ not made, but gives us access to our 
inner nature. On the other hand music is given to us as a universal, as will. If we 
accept Young’s reading of Schopenhauer’s theory where music depicts a 
‘psychological reality’, then  it might be possible to consider a theory of the origin of 
music which entails music as an innate phenomena which starts in the body, that is to 
say with the human voice. Psychobiologists Trevarthen and Malloch (2000:4xxv) write  
‘Research on how infants attend to and stimulate intuitive music in parent’s vocal play, and how they 
can imitate and reciprocate intricately co-ordinated expressions, strongly suggest that we are born like 
this and that the infant’s sympathy arises from an inborn rhythmic coherence of body movement and 
modulation of affective expressions. A paediatric neurologist can be trained to judge the health or 
distress of a premature new born infant’s brain choreographically, by evaluating the shape and timing, 
the rhythms and grace or non coordination of the spontaneous movements of the baby’s limbs. We 
believe that underlying acquired musical motor skills and perception of cultivated music forms is an 
intrinsic “musicality”, and this is an aspect of motivation and emotion that has power to communicate.’ 
It would seem from this empirical research that the elements of music can be seen to 
be apprehended from the earliest moments of life and that the body and music can be 
conceptualised as indigenous to one another, and that this is an innate state of affairs. 
From this empirical information I have tried to show how it might be possible to 
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conceptualise the will as objectified in and through the body, and suggest how the will 
might also be objectified through ‘the music of the body’. This can only happen in 
Schopenhauer’s terms because the will is given in the body through time, and 
therefore we can conceptualise music as objectified will as a developmental process. 
Conclusion 
In this dissertation I have presented Schopenhauer’s theory of music, and discussed 
some of the conceptual inconsistencies. I have also briefly discussed the same theory 
in the context of a music therapy setting where the problem of musical meaning is  
indigenous to the work, and where Schopenhauer’s theory applied seems both 
explanatory and to be already intuitively incorporated into the theoretical approach. I 
have tried therefore to show how whilst conceptually Schopenhauer suffers from 
criticism his ideas seem to make sense in musical situ. This may not be surprising 
given that his theory is of a music that exists prior to conceptualisation. In order to 
arrive at some conclusion as to how music can be understood intuitively as essence 
have finished by experimenting with the idea that whilst in empirical developmental 
theory music is indigenous to self and bodily expression, Schopenhauer’s theory of 
music might be best understood through relating it to another non-verbal 
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